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I. INTRODUCTION
Blacks and other minorities often find that they are stopped by
police without cause, simply for "driving while black. Once disre-
garded by police and mainstream media, the issue is now the focus
of media attention and public debate.' Racial profiling on vehicu-lar stops cannot be limited to a few isolated incidents.3  It has a
t Second-year student, William Mitchell College of Law. I would like to
thank Theresa Nelson of the Minnesota Civil Liberties Union for her assistance
and support.
1. See generally David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 266-67 (1999) [hereinafter Har-
ris, Driving While Black].
2. See generally Michael A. Fletcher, Driven to Extremes; Black Men Take Steps to
Avoid Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1996, at Al; Carl Ingram, Alleged Race Profil-
ing Is Targeted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at A3; Brad Knickerbocker, New Face of Ra-
cism in America, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2000, at 1;Julie N. Lynem &
Marshall Wilson, When Police Stop People for "Driving While Black", S.F. CHRON., Apr.
7, 1999, at Al; James Walsh & Dan Browning, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent,
STAR TRIB., July 23, 2000, at Al. For a broader, frequently updated survey of local
media coverage of the issue, see American Civil Liberties Union, Racial Profiling in
America, available at http://www.aclu.org/profiling/news-archive.html (last modi-
fied Sept. 26, 2000).
3. Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 1, at 288.
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broad imPact on all communities of color, both in terms of police
treatment and community attitudes toward police.5
Perhaps the earliest incident to highlight the issue involved
Robert Wilkins, a black attorney and public defender.6 Wilkins and
his family were stopped by an officer of the Maryland State Police
in 1993.' They were held until a drug-sniffing dog was brought and
then were ordered out of the car. s The car was searched without
consent.9 Finding nothing, the group was released after the driver
was issued a speeding ticket.'0 When Wilkins subsequently brought
action, a 1992 police report was found; it directed officers to watch
for "dealers and couriers (traffickers) [who] are predominantly
black 1 After the parties reached a settlement, the Maryland
State Police agreed to stop using racial profiles and to compile race
statistics on its stops. 2 But subsequently these statistics have been
broadly cited as evidence of racial profiling.3
Further investigation has revealed the scope of the problem.
In New Jersey, the United States Department of Justice brought ac-
tion in response to allegations of racial profiling. 4 Statistical stud-
ies, among the most comprehensive on the issue, showed serious
problems with racial profiling in the state. Then, in an unprece-
dented admission, New Jersey governor Christine Whitman ac-
4. Id. at 275-288 ("The Statistical Analysis"); DAVID A. HARRIS, DRIVING WHILE
BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION'S HIGHWAYS 27-35 (1999), available at
http://www.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html. This paper will not review sta-
tistical proof of racial profiling on vehicular stops.
5. Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 1, at 298-99; Frank Newport, Racial
Profiling Is Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men, GALLUP NEWS
SERVICE, Dec. 9, 1999, available in part at http://www.gallup.com/poll/indica-
tors/indrace.asp.
6. David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Su-
preme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 563-64
(1997).
7. Id. at 564.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 565 & n. 126.
12. Id. at 565.
13. HARRIS, supra note 4, at 32-35; Harriet Berovick, DWB: Driving While Black:
Incidents in New Jersey and Maryland Heat Up the Issue of Racial Profiling by State High-
way Patrols, TIME, June 15, 1998, at 35; Editorial, Evidence Mounts That Police Target
Minorities Excessively, USA TODAY, June 3, 1999, at 14A.
14. Iver Peterson, Whitman Says Troopers Used Racial Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 1999, at Al.
15. Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 1, at 277-280.
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knowledged that racial profiling had occurred.' 6 Two state troop-
ers were also indicted for concealing a disproportionate number of
race-based stops. 7 As a result, NewJersey adopted several initiatives
to combat racial profiling.' 8
As public awareness of racial profiling has increased, govern-
ment has responded in varying degrees. For example, within the
last year more than 100 police agencies began voluntary collection
of race data on persons who are stopped or searched. 9 Several
states have considered or passed legislation against racial profil-S 20 ...
ing. The issue has inspired studies and legislation at the federal
level. President Clinton issued an executive order requiring fed-
eral law enforcement agencies to end racial profiling and to collect
race data on searches and seizures.
Clearly, racial profiling is an important issue. Now, the legal
community must formulate a response to the problem. Part of this
response is to identify those affected by racial profiling. Thus, Part
II looks at the "model plaintiff," reviewing the extent of police
power on vehicular stops. Part III provides some possibilities for
litigation, focusing on major theories for action in federal courts, as
well as resolution in settlement. Part IV discusses legislative ap-
proaches, using recently passed legislation in Missouri as a model.
The scope of this survey is limited; success requires a broad array of
options. Thus, to resolve the problem, open dialogue is critical. A
working solution should involve police, civil rights advocates, and
the communities they serve.
16. Peterson, supra note 14, at Al.
17. Id.
18. Jerry Gray, New Jersey Plans to Forestall Suit on Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1999, at B13.
19. David Chanen, Patrol May Study Role of Race in Road Stops, STAR TRIB., Mar.
2, 2000, at lB.
20. Harris, Driving While Black, infra note 1, at 321-22. See also supra note 273
and accompanying text.
21. See generally Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th
Cong. (2000); Data Collection: The First Step in Coming to Grips with Racial Profiling,
Hearing on S.B. 821 Before the Senate Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and Prop-
erty Rights, 106th Cong. (2000); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACcOUNTING OFFICE, RA-
CIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS (2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg0041.pdf.
22. Memorandum on Fairness in Law Enforcement, 35 WKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1067 (June 9, 1999).
2001] 2033
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II. THE "MODEL PLAINTIFF"
Racial profiling causes disproportionate law enforcement
against persons of color." As a result, ordinary, law-abiding citizens
of color are more likely to be subject to unnecessary stops. These
persons are the "model plaintiffs," subject to greater suspicion
merely on the basis of race.
Before examining the extent of police powers when the model
plaintiff is stopped, a closer look at the hypothetical circumstances
is required. First, the stop is an ordinary traffic stop.25 The plaintiff
has not committed any crime other than a possible traffic violation.
Once stopped, the plaintiff follows police instructions. The stop
fails to reveal any probable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Later, the
plaintiff is released, perhaps with a traffic citation. In the course of
this transaction, a police officer holds extensive power over the
model plaintiff. Nevertheless, there are limits on the power of po-
lice, and encroachment on these limits may indicate racial profil-
ing.
The encounter begins when a police officer decides to pull
26over the plaintiff. In Whren v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that an officer can pull over any vehicle for a traffic violation,
regardless of the subjective reason for the stop.27 Thus, a traffic vio-
lation is a valid pretext for a stop, even though an officer's suspi-
cion arises on other grounds.2 8 Because nearly all drivers commit
traffic violations, this rule allows police to initiate encounters with
minority drivers at their own discretion, with potential for discrimi-
23. See Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 1, at 275-88 ("The Statistical
Analysis").
24. Id. at 290-91.
25. Although a traffic violation is probable cause for a traffic stop, the viola-
tion is not probable cause for custodial arrest. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 9.3 (3d ed. Supp. 2000). Instead, traffic stops are characterized as inves-
tigatory stops, under the standard set by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). E.g.,
United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1207
(2000); Valance v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1276 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113, 117 (1998) (dictum) (finding a traffic stop "more analogous" to an investiga-
tory stop than to an arrest); United States v. $404,905.00 in U.S. Currency, 182
F.2d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1999). Because of this characterization, an investigatory
stop-on grounds of "reasonable, articulable suspicion" of criminal activity, -
would not alter the analysis of the model plaintiffs circumstances. Terry, 392 U.S.
at 21.
26. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
27. Id. at 813.
28. Id. at 812-13.
2034 [Vol. 27:3
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 20
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss3/20
DRIVING WHILE BLACK
nation against blacks or hispanics.' 9 At this point during the en-
counter, the model plaintiff has few grounds for complaint, even if
racial profiling has occurred.
Once the plaintiff has pulled over, an officer has several basic
investigatory techniques at his disposal. The officer may request
the plaintiff's license and registration. 30 In addition, the officer
may ask questions related to the encounter, such as the vehicle's
31
destination and purpose. If contraband is in "plain view," and its
illegal nature is "readily apparent," then the officer may seize the
32 33
item. At night, "plain view" can be aided by a flashlight.
Yet this is only the beginning of many significant intrusions the
officer can impose during the stop. For example, the officer has
power to order the driver or passengers to get out of the vehicle.3 a
The officer may also ask to search the vehicle. If the plaintiff con-
sents, then the search is allowed.35 Furthermore, the officer does
not need to advise the plaintiff that consent can be withheld.36
Thus, commentators have noted that in the tense environment of a
police stop, consent to search is given without an understanding of
the rights conferred.3 7 Also, courts often find consent, even though
the driver exhibited distress when it was given.
These examples sketch out some elements of police power
during a stop. The permissible scope of these powers is guided by
29. David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highway, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 556, 560-61 (1998) [hereinafter Harris, Car Wars]; David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, Sup.
CT. REV. 271, 309 (1997); Chris K. Visser, Comment, Without a Warrant, Probable
Cause, or Reasonable Suspicion: Is There Any Meaning to the Fourth Amendment While
Driving a Car?, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1683, 1710 (1999).
30. United States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Diaz-Lizaranza, 981
F.2d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 1993).
31. E.g., Foley, 206 F.3d at 805; United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479,
1483 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1095 (1994).
32. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
33. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983) (plurality opinion).
34. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414-15 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
35. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
36. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996). If the plaintiff later contests
the search, the government has the burden to prove the plaintiff consented.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222.
37. Harris, Car Wars, supra note 29, at 571; Visser, supra note 29, at 1721-22.
38. United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656-57 (6th Cir. 1999); Valance v.
Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1279-80 (7th Cir. 1997). But see United States v. Dortch, 199
F.3d 193, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding consent was involuntary where earlier re-
fusals of consent were disregarded).
20011 2035
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the "objective reasonableness" test. First defined by the Supreme
Court in Teny v. Ohio,9 the test has two parts: (1) "whether the offi-
cer's action was justified at its inception," and (2) "whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."4 Since the rule in Whren effectively• • ,,41
justifies any traffic stop "at its inception, the principal inquiry is
whether the actions were "reasonably related in scope."
For a stop to be reasonable, many courts have indicated that
the stop should be brief, and carried out in the least intrusive man-
42ner available. But in recent decisions, when the Supreme Court
defines reasonableness, it included the concerns of the government
and the general public, not just the individual. In United States v.
Sharp 3 the Court noted, "While it is clear that the brevity of the in-
vasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an impor-
tant factor ... we have emphasized the need to consider the law en-
forcement purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time
reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. " 44 In particular,
"law enforcement purposes" have included police safety, as well as
the general public interest served by vigorous drug enforcement.46
Without a more rigid test for reasonable police conduct,47 these in-
terests create a rationale for further intrusions by police during
39. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry v. Ohio did not involve a vehicular stop. Rather, it
defined police powers for a "stop and frisk" encounter on the street. Id. at 12.
The limitations articulated in the case were subsequently adopted for investigatory
vehicular stops and traffic stops. E.g., Dortch, 199 F.3d at 198, Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); United States v. Hill, 198 F.3d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1207 (2000); United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1111
(10th Cir. 1998); Valance, 110 F.3d at 1276; United States v. Gonzalez-Lerma, 14
F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1095 (1994).
40. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
41. Supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
42. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 806 (8th Cir. 2000); Hill, 198 F.3d at 267.
43. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
44. Id. at 685 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1998).
46. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983); see also United States v.
Serna-Baretto, 842 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting "interest of the commu-
nity in being free from menace of crime").
47. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 686. In Sharpe, the Court refused to promulgate a
"bright line" test for the length of an investigatory stop. Id. However, the Court's
premise was to avoid any strict guideline for reasonableness, because discrete lim-
its "would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate
their responses to the demands of any particular situation." Id. (quoting Place, 462
U.S. at 710 n. 10).
2036 [Vol. 27:3
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traffic stops.
4 8
For example, during the model plaintiff's traffic stop, the offi-
cer may have a drug-sniffing dog examine the vehicle. The Su-
preme Court has already determined that a drug dog "sniff' is not a
"search" covered under the Fourth Amendment.49 Instead, a drug
dog's intrusion was deemed minimal.u° As a result, police are able
51to conduct a drug dog sniff during the course of any traffic stop.
Usually, once the traffic stop is completed, a motorist cannot
be detained for a drug dog sniff unless the officer has a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.52 However, in U.S. v.
$404,905.00 in U.S. Currency,53 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
may have cast doubt upon the reasonable suspicion requirement.
It noted that when a driver violated a traffic law, he "subjected him-
self and his vehicle to a period of official detention that might have
substantially exceeded the five to eight minutes it took [the officer]
to complete the traffic stop."5 4 Thus, it permitted a drug dog sniff,
without reasonable suspicion, immediately after the traffic stop was
complete.5 5 " [T] he two-minute canine sniff was a de minimis intru-
sion on [the driver's] personal liberty, like routinely ordering a law-
fully stopped motorist out of his vehicle to protect officer safety,,56
.... The Court cited the government's "strong interest in inter-
dicting the flow of illegal drugs along the nation's highways."
57
So much weight is accorded to drug interdiction and police
48. See generally Thomas Fusco, Annotation, Permissibility Under Fourth Amend-
ment of Detention of Motorist by Police, Following a Lawful Stop for Traffic Offense, to In-
vestigate Matters Not Related to Offense, 118 A.L.R. FED. 567 (1994).
49. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
50. Id.
51. E.g., United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d at 200. In Dortch, a police officer
detained a motorist so that a drug dog could sniff the vehicle. Finding that there
was no reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the detention, the detention and
subsequent dog sniff were found unconstitutional. However, the court noted that
the dog sniff, "if performed during the [traffic stop], would not have violated
Dortch's consittutional rights, because it is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. For more on the impact and use of drug dogs, see generally Har-
ris, Car Wars, supra note 29, at 572.
52. E.g., United States v. Foley, 206 F.3d 802, 805-06 (8th Cir. 2000); Dortch,
199 F.3d at 200; United States v. Hill, 198 F.3d 258, 272 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,
120 S.Ct. 1207 (2000).
53. 182 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 1999).
54. Id. at 649.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
2001] 2037
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58safety that significant intrusions by police are seemingly justified.
Unfortunately, persons of color are most likely to be perceived as a59
threat to these interests. If the officer feels this way about the
model plaintiff, that person may be threatened with a gun,60 hand-61 •62
cuffed or confined, or frisked for weapons. The perception of a
threat will also justify search of the vehicle. But if the model
plaintiff is cooperative and nonthreatening, then these sorts of in-
trusions are unwarranted; 64 the officer must have additional justifi-
cation. Thus, a frisk or vehicle search requires reasonable, articu-
lable suspicion of criminal activity.65 Lengthy confinement-lying
prone or remaining in handcuffs-usually requires probable cause
66for arrest.
There is one exception to the limitations on major intrusions
during a traffic stop. Some courts have found that the officer can
order the model plaintiff to sit in the officer's vehicle while a traffic
citation is issued. On an ordinary traffic stop, this order appears
58. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1998); United States v. Shareef,
100 F.3d 1491, 1502 (10th Cir. 1996); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1186
(9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 1988).
59. Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1502 (two black men superficially resembled "armed
and dangerous" suspects); United States v. Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292,
1294 (9th Cir. 1988) (hispanic man living near stakeout site superficially resem-
bled fugitive); United States v. Ceballos, 654 F.2d 177, 184 (2d Cir. 1981) (his-
panic man fit "profile" of drug offender, and drug offenders were presumed dan-
gerous).
60. Shareef 100 F.3d at 1502; Lego, 855 F.2d at 545; United States v Serna-
Baretto, 842 F.2d at 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29,
34-35 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
61. Shareef 100 F.3d at 1502; Del Vizo, 918 F.2d at 824; Lego, 855 F.2d at 545.
62. Knowles, 525 U.S. at 118; Lego, 955 F.2d at 545.
63. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). In practice, this rule per-
mits police to conduct a search at nearly any stop. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 9.5(e) (3d ed. 1996).
64. E.g., Del Vizo, 918 F.2d at 825 ("Indeed, the government cites no case in
which we have found "reasonable measures" in a Terry-stop [of a cooperative
motorist] to include drawing weapons on a cooperative suspect, ordering him out
of his vehicle and to lie prone on the street, and handcuffing him.").
65. E.g., United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
66. Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1996); Bloomfield, 40
F.3d at 917 (" [F] actors that may weigh in favor of an arrest are subjecting a suspect
to unnecessary delays, handcuffing him, or confining him in a police car."); Del
Vizo, 918 F.2d at 825-26.
67. United States v. Wellman, 185 F.3d 651, 656 (6th Cir. 1999); Bloomfield, 40
F.3d at 915; cf Pliska v. City of Stevens Point, 823 F.2d 1168, 1176-77 (7th Cir.
1987) (finding that confinement of person in locked squad car was within the
2038 [Vol. 27:3
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to be an extraordinary intrusion upon the liberty of the motorist.
Furthermore, it places the motorist in an intimidating situation.
Removal to a squad car may be a pretext, without reasonable suspi-
cion, for additional investigation. Courts, however, have permitted
this practice, in an apparently uncritical award of police power.68
The remaining limitation on the officer's execution of a traffic
stop is the length of the stop. As previously noted, many courts
stress brevity and lack of intrusiveness during traffic stops.69  But
there is no definite time limit for a traffic stop. Once a warning or
citation is issued, the officer cannot continue detaining a motorist,
nor ask questions unrelated to the stop, without a reasonable, ar-
ticulable suspicion of criminal activit " If the detention continues,
it will eventually ripen into an arrest.
During a traffic stop, police have broad powers at their dis-
posal. But the exercise of this power must be reasonable.73 Rea-
sonableness is not a static standard; it should respond to public ex-
pectations-not only in the law enforcement community, but also
in the communities of color they serve. Through action for the
model plaintiff, vigorous advocacy can reshape the reasonableness
standard, limiting abuses of power by police and reflecting the will
permissible scope of an investigatory stop).
68. United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir. 1996); Bloomfield,
40 F.3d at 915. For example, to support its analysis Bloomfield cites United States v.
Richards, 967 F.2d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 1992). But, in Richards it is unclear
whether the officer in fact asked the motorist to sit in the squad car. Richards, 967
F.2d at 1191, 1193.
69. Supra text accompanying note 42.
70. United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 270 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120
S.Ct. 1207 (2000) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983); United
States v. Sowers, 136 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1998); Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 916-17; see
also United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1501-02 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting cir-
cumstances which legitimately delay completion of a traffic stop).
71. Dortch, 199 F.3d at 198-99 (5th Cir. 1999); Hill, 198 F.3d at 272; United
States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1111-12 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Gon-
zalez-Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1095
(1994). Also, once the transaction is completed, an officer cannot hold the
driver's license or documentation in order to extend the length of the traffic stop.
Dortch, 199 F.3d at 198.
72. E.g., Shareef, 100 F.3d at 1500; Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 917. This assertion
simplifies the factors in determining whether a stop has become an arrest. Usu-
ally, to determine whether an arrest has occurred, courts review a "laundry list" of
factors. Id. See also United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For
the model plaintiff, no probable cause for arrest is apparent. Thus, justificiation
for arrest is negligible, and length of detention is the only probative factor to de-
termine an arrest. Id.
73. Supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
2001] 2039
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of the community.
III. LITIGATION
For those who are subjected to racial profiling, the incident
74can cause fear, mistrust, and anger. To vindicate their rights, they
may seek recourse through the courts. However, a positive result is
not always assured. 75 Even if a victim of racial profiling prevails, the
76result may not lead to a change in police behavior. Nonetheless,
litigation is an important tool for action, and it requires a close
look. This section will focus on federal remedies for violations of
civil rights.77 For each remedy, both basic elements of the prima
facie case, as well as strategic factors, will be considered. This in-
formation will clarify the possibilities, and the goals, of litigation.
A. The Section 1983 Claim
In cases of police misconduct, 42 U.S.C. section 1983 is the
most common basis for action. The statute provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
right, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.78
This provision has been construed as a "constitutional tort," provid-
74. Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 1, at 269-75; Sklansky, supra note 29,
at 312-13; see also Newport, supra note 5 (finding that thirty-six percent of all blacks
had an unfavorable opinion of local police).
75. Jennifer A. Larrabee, Note, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Protec-
tion: The Realities of an Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6J. L. & POL'Y 291, 315 (1997)
(proof of discriminatory intent "insurmountable"); Alison L. Patton, Note, The
Endless Cycle of Abuse: Why 42 U. S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 753, 757 (1993) (police misconduct is a "very difficult" area of law,
with few victories for plaintiffs).
76. PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL
WRONGS 14 (1983); Patton, supra note 75, at 768.
77. Administrative remedies, as well as rights of action reserved to the United
States Attorney General, will not be discussed. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 3789d
(1994); 42 U.S.C.A. § 1414 (1995).
78. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1994).
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ing redress when a person's constitutional rights are violated.79
Many of elements of a Section 1983 claim are shared by other civil
rights claims.80 Thus, Section 1983 is a good starting point for dis-
cussion.
A Section 1983 claim has two essential elements. First, the
plaintiff must have been deprived of a constitutional right."' Sec-
ond, the deprivation must have been committed by a person acting
under color of state law. However, a Section 1983 claim also re-
quires the plaintiff to decide whom to sue, and what damages or
other remedies are available.88
Deprivation of a Constitutional Right. When a court analyzes a
Section 1983 claim, it first decides what constitutional rights, if any,
84
have been infringed . On a vehicular stop, ordinary search and
seizure issues are raised under the Fourth Amendment. However,
allegations of racial profiling will raise the Equal Protection Clause
85
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because of these different stan-
dards, an unlawful detention under the Fourth Amendment can-
not, by itself, prove that racial profiling occurred.
A violation of the Fourth Amendment is determined by the
"objective reasonableness" standard.86 This standard was discussed
earlier, while examining the extent of police power against the
"model plaintiff."s T As noted, the test asks (1) "whether the offi-
cer's action was justified at its inception," and (2) "whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place."m Because the test is objective, rea-
sonableness is determined "in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting [police officers], without regard to their ... motiva-
79. E.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1986).
80. Infra Parts II.B., III.C.
81. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
82. Id.
83. See generally John Mahoney, The Prima Facie Section 1983 Case, in SECTION
1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 119, 120 (Robert H. Freilich & Richard G. Carlisle eds.,
1983).
84. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989); see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at
535-36.
85. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[T]he constitutional
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role
in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.").
86. Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
87. Supra Part II.
88. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
20412001]
11
Moriarity: Responding to the Issue of "Driving While Black": A Plan for Comm
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tion."s9 A Fourth Amendment violation must also be willful, in the
sense that the officer's action was an intentional use of police
power rather than an accident."° However, it is important to note
that the officer's state of mind is not relevant to intent in this
91
sense.
On the other hand, the officer's state of mind can be critical to
a claim based on violation of the Equal Protection Clause. A viola-
tion occurs if "discriminatory purpose" is a motivating factor in the
police officer's enforcement of the law.9' Discriminatory purpose
by police can be established in two ways: conduct may be discrimi-
natory "on its face" or discriminatory "in its application.
9 3
To be discriminatory on 9its face, discrimination must be ex-4
pressed in the conduct itself. In court, this is difficult to prove,
since police officers will rarely admit to racism as the motivation for
their conduct.95  Furthermore, courts are reluctant to find dis-
criminatory purpose, even where it would appear clear. For exam-
ple, use of a racial epithet will not support a claim of discriminatory
96
purpose.
To prove an action is discriminatory in its application, the
plaintiff must provide facts that will create an inference of dis-
criminatory purpose.9' A "disparate impact" on members of a racial
minority cannot prove discriminatory purpose, but may help show
that purpose."" Other factors include historical background lead-
ing to the challenged conduct, the immediate sequence of events
leading to the conduct, and any departures from established pro-
89. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
90. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989).
91. Id. at 596, 598.
92. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977). Village of Arlington Heights subsequently guided analysis of Equal
Protection Clause issues. E.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 488
(1997).
93. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.4 (3d ed. 1999).
94. Id.
95. Randall S. Suskind, Race, Reasonable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRiM. L.
REV. 327, 341 (1994).
96. Hopson v. Fredricksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no
discriminatory intent where officer "uttered a racial slur" and threatened to knock
plaintiffs teeth out); Wade v. Fisk, 575 N.Y.S.2d 394, 396 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that
racial epithet cannot form the basis for a Section 1983 claim). Courts have not
considered the consequence of this rule; in effect, a direct verbal expression of
racial hatred somehow does not indicate "discriminatory purpose." Id.
97. Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
98. Id. at 264-65.
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cedure for the conduct."9
Many of these factors can be difficult to establish, particularly
because police procedures will not show any discriminatory pur-
pose. Absent other proof of discriminatory purpose, a neutral pro-
cedure does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, even if it re-
sults in a "disproportionately adverse" affect on a minority.00 But if
a neutral procedure leads to a "clear pattern" of discrimination that
is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," discriminatory in-
tent is found.1"1
One way of showing a "clear pattern" of discrimination is
through the use of statistics. 0 ' However, courts may misinterpret
or mistrust statistical evidence.' Statistics may be poorly executed
or even anecdotal. 04  In McCleskey v. Kemp, 10 the Supreme Court.... 106
was given a rigorous statistical model. The Court refused to ac-
cept the result of the model, preferring "exceptionally clear
proof."10 7 The Court also expressed discomfort at the idea that sta-
tistics might explain the consequences of public policy. 0 8 Never-
theless, statistical evidence may be useful, particularly in class ac-
tion suits. Furthermore, proposed legislation on racial profiling
99. Id. at 267.
100. Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); see also Reno v. Bossier
Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1997).
101. Viii. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
102. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 & n. 11 (1987); Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 375 (1976); Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 507 (9th
Cir. 1993).
103. Douglas L. Williams, Statistical Evidence in Discrimination Cases, C874 ALI-
ABA 801, 807-08 (1993); see also Kingsley R. Browne, The Strangely Persistent "Trans-
position Fallacy": Why "Statistically Significant" Evidence of Discrimination May Not Be
Significant, 14 LAB. LAW. 437, 438 (1998) (discussing use of statistics in employ-
ment discrimination cases).
104. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 460-61, 470 (1996); Williams,
supra note 103, at 807-08. In Armstrong, the claimants' statistical "study" was based
on the anecdotal experience of defense attorneys and a newspaper article. Arm-
strong, 517 U.S. at 460-61.
105. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
106. Id. at 289 n.6.
107. Id. at 297. For examples of "exceptionally clear proof," the Court pro-
vided cases where (1) a state legislature altered the boundary of a city from a
square to an "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," and (2) out of 310 laundry own-
ers who required licenses to continue operation, all of the Chinese-American
owners-200 of the 310-were denied licenses. Id. at 293 n.12. Cf ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 93, § 18.4 (noting that the Court finds statistical proof "usually
relevant but rarely determinable").
108. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-95 & n.15(1987).
109. E.g., Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1993).
2001] 2043
13
Moriarity: Responding to the Issue of "Driving While Black": A Plan for Comm
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
often includes government compilation of race data on vehicular110
stops. This data, collected under the auspices of government,
would likely be more persuasive to the courts.
In review, between the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the standards for constitutional deprivation vary
widely, presenting different burdens of proof. A claim under the
Fourth Amendment may redress an officer's objectively wrongful
conduct on the stop, but cannot address any race-based motivation
for the action. By raising the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, the plaintiff directly challenges racial dis-
crimination, but is also faced with a difficult burden of proof."'
Unless discriminatory purpose is clearly obvious from a single inci-
dent, victims of racial profiling are best served by class action. This
way, plaintiffs can combine resources and investigate the facts more
thoroughly. Each plaintiff gains credibility when it is clear that
their experiences are not isolated, but part of a broader pattern.
Last of all, the class action forms a basis for community action, cre-
ating a network of people with similar concerns acting together.
Whom to Sue and Why. Next, the plaintiff must select the de-
fendants. Section 1983 requires the defendant to act "under color
of state law."' 12 Whenever an officer's action relies upon authority• 113
granted by the state, that action is under color of state law. A ve-
hicular stop is a clear use of police authority. Thus, on most stops,
officers are amenable to suit under Section 1983.
However, there are some constitutional limitations on whether
an officer can be sued. For example, federal officers do not act
under color of state law, and thus cannot be sued under Section
1983.114 State officers, such as state highway patrol, cannot be sued
It is not certain whether class action suits are permitted under Section 1983. E.g.,
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 365 n.1, 373 n.7 (1976) (declining to rule on
whether Section 1983 permitted class action); Thomas, 978 F.2d at 507 (accepting
class action). See also 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIvIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
LITIGATION: THE LAw OF SEcTION 1983 § 4:16 (4th ed. 1996) (questioning whether
damages can be apportioned for a class action). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
110. InfraPartIV.
111. Larrabee, supra note 75, at 315 (finding proof of discriminatory purpose
nearly "insurmountable").
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1994).
113. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-108 (1945); Rogers v. City of Lit-
tie Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 798 (8th Cir. 1998); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441
(6th Cir. 1975).
114. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 398 n. 1 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring).
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in their official capacity." 5 However, state officers can be sued in
their individual capacity." 6 In all other cases, including municipal
and county police, officers are amenable to suit.17
Other limitations arise when a supervisory entity-such as a
municipality, county, or state-is sued. Because of the Eleventh
Amendment, states are immune from suit under section 1983.1 8 A
municipality or county can be sued directly, but liability does not
arise simply because it employed an officer that violated the Consti-
tution.19 Stated another way, a municipality is not vicariously liable
for the constitutional torts of its employees. Rather, to impose
liability, the municipality must have a separate "policy or custom"
which led to the deprivation of constitutional rights. In terms of
police conduct, relevant policies or customs include hiring prac-
tices, training practices, and supervision.
If a municipality "directly authorizes" a violation of constitu-
122tionally protected rights, then liability can be directly imposed.
But where hiring, training, or supervision policies indirectly lead to
constitutional violations, a causal link between the policy and the
violation is difficult to establish. 2 3 Therefore, liability is not im-
posed unless policymakers show "conscious disregard" or "deliber-
ate indifference" to the consequences of their decisions. Thisstandard is very narrow: even gross negligence will not permit liabil-
115. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Even
though action against federal and state officers is limited under Section 1983, re-
lief for constitutional deprivation is available by other means. Infra text accompa-
nying notes 163-74.
116. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 166-67 (1985). For an examination of possible claims against state police of-
ficers and states, as well as the distinction between official and individual capacity,
see supra text accompanying notes 163-74.
117. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 662 (1978); see also id. at 705
(Powell, J., concurring).
118. Will, 491 U.S. at 66. The Eleventh Amendment provides, "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
119. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1997); Monell,
436 U.S. at 690-91.
120. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
121. Id. at 694.
122. Brown, 520 U.S. at 406.
123. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
124. Id. at 389; see also Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1074-75 (8th Cir. 1996)
(finding liability where a pattern of misconduct was "persistent and widespread"
and policymakers "deliberately failed" to take action).
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ity.11 Instead, this standard requires that policymakers have notice
of constitutional violations but then fail to act. Unless an action
is expressly authorized, a single incident is insufficient to prove a
municipality's deliberate disregard for others' rights. 1
7
Once again, problems of proof confront the plaintiff. Because
a single incident is insufficient to show deliberate disregard, an in-
dividual plaintiff cannot rely on just his or her own experience as. . 128
grounds to sue a municipality. But, even if the municipality is not
a party, it will usually compensate for the liability of its employees
in their official capacity. The advantage of having a municipality
as a party, aside from the possibility of damages, is that it may per-
mit equitable relief against the municipality. Thus, the action is
more likely to change community policing policies."' Further-
more, if a municipal custom is found unconstitutional in one case,
then collateral estoppel may operate in subsequent cases against
the municipality, givinq other plaintiffs affected by the custom the
chance to step forward.
Qualified Immunity. For persons subject to liability under Sec-
tion 1983, qualified immunity can provide an affirmative defense.
The defendant must plead qualified immunity and carry its burden
of proof.' 34 In the leading case on qualified immunity, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald,'33 the Supreme Court promulgated an objective test that
holds officials immune "insofar as their conduct does not violate
125. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407.
126. Id. ("If a program does not prevent constitutional violations, municipal
decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is called
for."); Andrews, 98 F.3d at 1075, 1078.
127. Harris, 489 U.S. at 390-91; City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
821 (1985).
128. As previously noted, fundamental problems of proof argue for class action
in Section 1983 claims. Supra text accompanying note 111.
129. E.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 699 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at5, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913) (noting that if a judgment is assessed against an
actor in his or her official capacity, fees and costs are assessed to the municipality);
Patton, supra note 75, at 759 (noting that California law requires municipalities to
pay forjudgments against their police officers).
130. Infra text accompanying notes 157-62.
131. SCHUCK, supra note 76, at 14, 79.
132. MICHAEL AVERY & DAVID RUDOVSKY, POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LmGA-
TION § 14.2(g) (2d ed. 1992).
133. 1 NAHMOD, supra note 109, at § 8.1. The immunity extends to police offi-
cers, school board members, mental hospital administrators, and prison officials.
Id.
134. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980).
135. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a rea-
sonable person would have known. " 6
Since the adoption of this test, the extent of the immunity has
broadened. The "clearly established rights" of the test-rather
than referring to broad principles of law-refer to more "particu-
larized" violations of constitutional rights.1 17 And those rights are
defined by what a "reasonable official would understand." By this
reasoning, an officer's mistake allows violation of another's consti-
tutional rights, if a reasonable officer could make the same mistake
under the circumstances.13 9
As a practical matter, qualified immunity will be raised in any
Section 1983 litigation with police. Since it is often a matter for
140summary judgment, plaintiffs will want to make thorough fact in-
vestigation prior to trial, and to take advantage of any discovery per-
mitted prior to the motion.
Municipalities and counties do not receive any immunities,
qualified or sovereign, under Section 1983.41
Damages and Injunction.14 Actual damages are not essential for
136. Id. at 818. By adopting this rule, the Court abolished a subjective compo-
nent that had been part of the qualified immunity standard. 1 NAHMOD, supra
note 109, at § 8.5; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814. In doing so, the Court noted,
"[W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject
government officials either to the costs of trial " Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
However, the new rule has, in effect, significantly increased the burdens of those
seeking relief under Section 1983. See generally 1 NAHMOD, supra note 109, at §
8.5.
137. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 (1987).
138. Id. at 640.
139. Id. at 641. The "exigent circumstances" doctrine, significantly expands
qualified immunity. Id. at 657-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The doctrine permits
any officer to claim that their constitutional violation is a "mistake" that a "reason-
able officer" could have made. Id. Since subjective motivation is no longer a
component of qualified immunity, the doctrine in effect creates a presumption of
good faith when a "mistake" occurs. Id.
Justice Stevens also finds that the exigent circumstances doctrine creates a
constitutional double standard. at 663-66. For example, under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer's search must be reasonable. But even if an unreasonable
search is mistakenly executed, a second standard-that of the mistaken "reason-
able" police officer-may then exempt the officer from liability. Thus, the rule
allows a certain number of unreasonable police searches as a matter of routine po-
lice practice. The exigent circumstances doctrine may allow erosion of other con-
stitutional rights. A more critical treatment of the doctrine is beyond the scope of
this paper, but the doctrine should be subject to scrutiny.
140. 1 NAHMOD, supra note 109, at § 8:23. See also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818
(summaryjudgment avoids "excessive disruption of government").
141. Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980).
142. Although not covered in detail here, attorneys' fees are available for a
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a Section 1983 claim. 43 But if damages are sought, the principles
of common law torts apply.14 Thus, grounds for compensatory
damages may include physical injuries, 14 5 mental or emotional dis-1 t6 '47
tress, and other out-of-pocket expenses. 41 Punitive damages are
also available from individual actors48 but not from municipali-
ties. 4 9 The defendant can incur punitive damages for either "reck-
less or callous disregard for the plaintiffs rights" or "intentional
violations of federal law."150 Yet, courts place no "abstract value" on
a violation of civil rights.151 Even if a violation is proven, damages
are not presumed. 2 Nor does a special category of damages flow
from a civil rights violation.153
For a racial profiling claim, the closest analogy in common law
tort is false imprisonment. A vehicular stop, especially if brief, may
not appear to provide many grounds for damages.M However, sig-
nificant emotional distress may occur during false imprisonment,
including feelings of degradation and inferiority, humiliation,
fright, and embarrassment. 5 Even without racially discriminatory
purpose, if the plaintiff feels that racial profiling had occurred,
then these feelings may be heightened-and thus important when
proving damages. In addition, under federal tort common law, re-
covery for emotional distress does not require proof of physical
symptoms. 156 Punitive damages should also be pursued. For exam-
successful action under Section 1983. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1994).
143. Careyv. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).
144. Id. at 257-58.
145. E.g., Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665, 669 (11th Cir. 1990).
146. E.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986);
Carey, 435 U.S. at 263-64.
147. E.g., Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307; Wright, 919 F.2d at 669; Smith v. Heath, 691
F.2d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 1982).
148. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983).
149. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981).
150. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 51.
151. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308.
152. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262-63 (1978).
153. Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308.
154. See generally Fassettv. Haeckel, 936 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1991) (awarding
no damages to claimant for unlawful vehicular stop); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d
147, 174 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (in class action, awarding damages on a sliding scale;
claimants detained up to twelve hours received one hundred and twenty dollars);
Davet v. Maccarone, 775 F. Supp. 492, 494-95 (D.R.I. 1991), affd 973 F.2d 22 (1st
Cir. 1992) (awarding no damages to claimant for unlawful overnight detention in
jail).
155. Wright v. Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665, 669 (11th Cir. 1990).
156. E.g., Davet, 775 F. Supp. at 493-94. State common law standards for emo-
tional distress recovery are inapplicable. Id. at 494 n.1.
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pie, if discriminatory purpose is proven, "callous disregard" for the
plaintiffs rights should follow from the facts.
In addition to money damages, Section 1983 can provide
grounds for an injunction. For an injunction to be issued, plain-
tiff must show a "real and immediate threat" of the "likelihood of
substantial and immediate irreparable injury."5 8 In terms of police
conduct, plaintiffs may be required to show a greater likelihood of
injury from police than other citizens would receive,'59 or that this
likelihood is greater than in comparable metropolitan areas.'6 A
persistent or pervasive pattern of conduct, particularly with multi-
ple incidents against a single claimant, is more persuasive.'6 Police
misconduct can also be more clearly illustrated by tracking actions162
in a small geographic area. In any case, injunctive relief requires
a detailed fact record.
State and Federal Actors. Section 1983 provides redress for con-
stitutional violations of municipalities and counties. But federal
entities, as well as states and their police agencies, are not subject to
action under Section 1983. 63 This does not leave the victim of state
and federal abuses without relief, however. Other actions, similar
in most respects to Section 1983, are available.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, the Supreme Court allowed action against federal agents
157. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976).
158. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983); see also Rizzo, 423
U.S. at 372-73; Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 507 (9th Cir.
1993).
159. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111 ("Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be
wronged in a similar way, [plaintiff] is no more entitled to an injunction than any
other citizen of Los Angeles.").
160. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 375. In Rizzo, the court refused an injunction, in part
because police misconduct did not differ from that found elsewhere. Id. " [T ] he
problems disclosed by the record are fairly typical of those afflicting police de-
partments in major urban areas." Id. (quoting Council of Orgs. on Philadelphia
Police Accountability and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp.. 1289, 1318 (E.D.Pa.
1973), rev'd sub nom. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976))(alterations omitted).
This logic raises some problems. Injunctive relief could be denied on the ground
that many police departments face allegations of racial profiling. In effect, if a
pattern of police misconduct is pervasive enough, then an injunction will not is-
sue.
161. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 374-75; Thomas, 978 F.2d at 508.
162. Thomas, 978 F.2d at 507 (examining record of police misconduct in six by
seven block area).
163. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (finding no
Section 1983 liability for states or their agencies); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 399 n. 1 (1971) (Harlan,J.,
concurring) (noting no federal liability under Section 1983).
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for violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 64 The Court subsequently
recognized causes for relief arising directly from other provisions of
the Constitution. 65 These suits, seeking relief for constitutional
violations of federal officials, are now generally known as "Bivens
actions."' 66 In practice, Bivens actions are analogous to Section
1983 actions, with the same prima facie elements, defenses, and
damages.167
Liability for the constitutional violations of state officials was
first recognized in Ex parte Young.16  In this case, the Supreme
Court held that state officials are liable in equity for violations of
the federal Constitution. 169 An injunction may issue, but the Elev-
enth Amendment bars recovery of money damages from the
state. 17  Thus, Young will allow action against state police,171 but
prospects for relief under the theory are limited."'
Money damages are not foreclosed, however. Not only are
state police suable in their official capacity under Young, but also in
their individual capacity under Section 1983.13 In an individual
capacity action, if liability is found, then it is imposed solelY upon
the individual officer and collected from that person's assets.
164. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
165. E.g., Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242-44 (1979) (permitting cause of
action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
166. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 805 (1982); Dellums v. Powell,
566 F.2d 147, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
167. E.g., Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30 (finding no distinction between Bivens
actions and Section 1983 for immunity purposes); Dellums, 566 F.2d at 283-84
(adopting prima facie elements of Section 1983 for Bivens actions).
168. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
169. Id. at 155-56.
170. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Haiderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03
(1984); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978). However, if the action is suc-
cessful, attorneys' fees can be recovered, even though the fees are paid by the
state. Missouri v.Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989); Hutto, 437 U.S. at 692.
171. Andrus v. Arkansas, 197 F.3d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 1999); Akella v. Michigan
Dep't of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716, 722 (E.D.Mich. 1999); Reyes v. Supervi-
sor of Drug Enforcement Admin., 647 F. Supp.. 1509, 1512 (D.P.R. 1986), vacated
on other grounds, 834 F.2d 1093 (1st Cir. 1987).
172. The scope of injunctive relief under Young has not been defined. In
dicta, the Supreme Court has suggested that state "policy or custom" is the basis
for relief. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). This standard would be
analogous to that for municipal liability. See supra text accompanying notes 122-
27. For comparison, consider the availability of injunction for Section 1983 ac-
tions. See supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
173. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991); Graham, 473 U.S. at 166.
174. Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Individual liability has harsher consequences on
state police than on municipal and county police. Municipal and county officers
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B. The Section 1985(3) Claim
Similar to Section 1983, 42 U.S.C. section 1985 imposes liabil-
ity for deprivation of constitutional rights. But Section 1985 is a
conspiracy provision, operating against the actions of two or more
persons, regardless of whether those persons act under color of
state law. Paragraph three of the section provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire,
or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of
another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hin-
dering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory
the equal protection of the laws; . . . the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of dam-
ages.., against any one or more of the conspirators.
1 7 5
The provision is used most frequently against public officials."' It
provides an important expansion of options for civil rights litiga-
tion.
The prima facie Section 1985(3) case has four elements. The
claimant must show (1) a conspiracy (2) whose purpose is to de-
prive any person or class of equal protection of laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the law; and that (3) an action in
furtherance of the conspiracy (4) injured the claimant, damaged
the claimant's property, or deprived the claimant of his or her
rights. 77
Conspiracy. For the first element, courts have not promulgated
a consistent definition for conspiracy. 178 But, a partial definition
may be clearly inferred from Section 1985 (3) cases. At minimum, a
conspiracy involves two or more persons, with a plan to cause injury
are generally compensated for liability acquired in the line of duty. E.g., Patton,
supra note 75, at 759.
175 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985 (1994).
176. Michael Finch, Governmental Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: A Theory Re-
considered, 57 MONT. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1996).
177. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); see also Larson v.
Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir. 1996); Tilton v. Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686
(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied. 510 U.S. 1093 (1994); Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2nd Cir. 1993); Lenard v. Argento, 699
F.2d 874, 883 (7th Cir. 1983). The "four" elements result from a somewhat clumsy
reformulation of Section 1985's language in Griffin.
178. Cf Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)
("[A] ttempts at definition [of conspiracy] will not help.").
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to others. 9 Not all members of the conspiracy need to know the
details of the plan, so long as all members share a common objec-
tive.180
Purpose to Deprive Others of Recognized Rights. The second ele-
ment limits Section 1985(3) to conspiracies whose purpose is to
deprive others of equal protection, or privileges and immunities,
under the law.'8 ' For this element, "purpose" has been narrowly
read to require "racial ... invidiously discriminatory animus.,,182
The conspiracy does not have to intend to harm the claimant spe-
cifically, but only to harbor ill will" toward members of the plain-
tiffs race.184
Then, this purpose must be directed toward deprivation of a.... 185
recognized right. In particular, the asserted right must be en-
forceable against a private actor, 18 6 even if the conspirators are pub-
lic officials. Therefore, constitutional rights against state action,
which may create liability under Section 1983, do not necessarily
create liability under Section 1985(3)."" The principal right rec-
ognized under Section 1985(3) is the right to interstate travel, im-
plied from the Thirteenth Amendment.
Other rights are less settled. For example, Section 1985(3)
provides liability when a private entity denies equal protection un-
der the law.8 9 But this right does not implicate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the lan-
guage is similar. 9 Similarly, the provisions in the Bill of Rights are
179. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 229 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1267 (1997); Larson, 76 F.3d at 1454; Edmonds v. Dillin, 485 F. Supp.. 722, 729
(N.D. Ohio 1980) (defining conspiracy for claims against a municipality and its
police officers).
180. Collyer, 98 F.3d at 229; Jones, 856 F.2d at 992.
181. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102-03.
182. Id. at 102; see also Larson, 76 F.3d at 1454; Mian, 7 F.3d at 1087-88; Tilton, 6
F.3d at 686. See generally 3 JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS AC-
TIONS 13.09[A] (2000).
183. Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1386 (6th Cir. 1972).
184. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274 (1993).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 278.
187. Id.; see also Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686-87.
188. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971).
189. E.g., Elmwood Props. v. Conzelman, 418 F.2d 1025, 1028 (7th Cir. 1969).
190. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 272 n.4 (1993)
(comparing discriminatory purpose under Section 1985(3) and under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court observed, "We
think [the discriminatory purpose] principle applicable to § 1985(3) not because
we believe that Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence is automatically incorpo-
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generally inapplicable.'9 '
However, if the actors in a conspiracy are police, then further
rights may be implicated. For example, in United Brotherhood of Car-
penters, Local 610 v. Scott, 92 the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the First Amendment may apply if "it is proved that the state is in-
volved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to in-
fluence the activity of the state. ''19 If this principle holds, then con-
stitutional protections against state action could be applied against
police; as actors with color of state law, police would implicate the
authority of the state to further the conspiracy. Still, the applica-
tion of Section 1985 to police misconduct requires further devel-
'94
opment.
Action by the Conspiracy. The third element is an action, by a
conspiracy member, furthering its purpose. The actor does not
need to know the full scope of the conspiracy, so long as that per-
son shares the conspiracy's purpose.
96
rated into § 1985(3), but rather because it is inherent in the requirement of a
class-based animus ... " Id. Although this observation is in dicta, it points out a
possible strategic advantage in actions under Section 1985(3) rather than Section
1983. According to the Court, "invidiously discriminatory animus" is "inherent" in
discriminatory purpose under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. This comparison
allows the inference that racial animus under Section 1985(3) is a lower standard.
Cf supra text accompanying notes 97-101 (outlining the discriminatory purpose
test for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
See also United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 832 (1983)
(noting that Section 1985(3) does not expressly refer to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
191. E.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610, 463 U.S. at 831, 833-34.
192. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
193. Id. at 830.
194. See generally Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 883 (7th Cir. 1983) (affirm-
ing lower court's determination; police use of racial epithets and alleged beating
did not prove conspiracy to deny equal protection of law); Edmonds v. Dillin, 485
F. Supp.. 722, 729 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
[If through its mayor or other executive leadership ... a municipal cor-
poration should combine or agree with one or more police officers, act-
ing individually and independently of the city, to specifically deprive an
individual of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and in furtherance of that combination or agree-
ment one of the conspiring police officers acts with a specific intent to
deprive said individual of such rights, a Section 1985 conspiracy claim
would be stated against the municipal corporation and its police officers.
Id.
195. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971); see also Lenard, 699
F.2d at 883 (finding that conspiracy requires an "overt act").
196. E.g., Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 221, 229 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1267 (1997);Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Even though a plaintiff has suffered from a conspiracy's ac-
tions, that person may not be aware of a conspiracy. Proof of a
conspiracy often relies on inferences surrounding the facts.'97 For
example, in the case of racial profiling, the conspiracy arises before
or after the encounter with the plaintiff. The officers agree, either
explicitly or implicitly, to misreport or omit facts that prove mis-
conduct-the arrangement better known as the "code of silence.1 98
It allows police to act without fear of reprisal, on the understanding
that their colleagues or supervisors will not report their miscon-
duct.' 99 Thus, if investigation reveals that more than one officer
knew of police misconduct, but police records fail to reflect this
knowledge, then a Section 1985(3) action should be considered."'
Damages.2°' For the last element, the plaintiff must show that
the conspirator's action injured the plaintiff, damaged the plain-
tiffs property, or deprived the plaintiff of a recognized right.
202
More plainly put, the plaintiff must show damages.
The case law for Section 1985(3) does not offer an in-depth
analysis for available remedies. However, a comparison of Section
1983 and Section 1985(3) is instructive. Both provisions were
passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.203 Thus, as for Section
197. E.g., Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 970 F.2d 785, 789 (11th
Cir. 1992) (finding that prima facie case for Section 1985(3) conspiracy may rely
on circumstantial evidence); Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 993 (5th Cir. 1979)
(noting that proof of conspiracy "must often be met by circumstantial evidence;
conspirators rarely formulate their plans in ways susceptible of proof by direct evi-
dence").
198. See generally Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts, Ma'am" Lying and the Omission
of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1 (1993).
199. Id. at 12, 14; Patton, supra note 75, at 763 ; see also NEAL E. TRAUTMAN, NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE ON ETHICS, CODE OF SILENCE REsEARCH 12 (2000) (on file with
author). Trautman conducted a nationwide survey on the "code of silence." Id.
Of the 1,157 police officers who responded, forty-six percent admitted to witness-
ing and not reporting their colleagues' misconduct. Id.
200. E.g., Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) (showing
police fabricated grounds for arrest, filed false reports, and gave false testimony);
Mody v. City of Hoboken, 758 F. Supp. 1027, 1029, 1033 (D.N.J. 1991) (showing
police failed to report or respond to racially motivated violence).
The doctrine of qualified immunity may apply to Section 1985(3) actions
in some cases. Currently, the federal circuit courts are split on the applicability of
the doctrine. Compare Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 1101 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 515 U.S. 1142 (1995) with Burrell, 970 F.2d at 794. For an examination of the
doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 133-141.
201. Although not covered in detail here, attorneys' fees are available for a
successful action under Section 1985. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1994).
202. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971).
203. Finch, supra note 176, at 2.
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1983, the remedies for Section 1985(3) are developed out of com-
204mon law tort principles. It is unclear whether this relationship
permits Section 1983's remedies to be imported, without further
consideration, into Section 1985(3).°5
Under Section 1985(3), the ordinary basis for relief is com-
pensatory damages, which may include physical injury and mental
distress. Punitive damages are also available. In addition, since
the conspiracy's purpose is the willful deprivation of others' rights,
punitive damages should follow any successful Section 1985(3)
20820
claim. Courts have also provided injunctive relief.
When evaluating possible damages, it should be emphasized
that Section 1985(3) acts against public officials in their individual
capacity."1 Thus, if the action is successful, the judgment is col-
lected against the official's personal assets. 21' A government entity
cannot be held vicariously liable, nor is it required to indemnify the
official's liability.212
Section 1986 Actions. Once a Section 1985 conspiracy is proven,
213
liability is limited to private entities. However, under 42 U.S.C.
204. Id. at 18-19.
205. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (violator "shall be liable ... in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress) with 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(2000) (violator "may have an action for the recovery of damages"). Note that Sec-
tion 1985(3) does not expressly permit equitable remedies. But see Action v.
Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1237-38 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding availability of equitable
relief under Section 1985(3) implied from its availability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
206. Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 892 (7th Cir. 1983). Deprivation of
rights does not create a special category of damages, such as "special damages" or
"substantial damages," and proof of injury is required. Id. Cf Memphis Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (disallowing special damages un-
der Section 1983).
207. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1267 (7th Cir. 1984); Crowe v.
Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 992 (5th Cir. 1979).
208. Finch, supra note 176, at 12-13 (commenting that Section 1985(3) con-
spiracy "implies a higher degree of culpability" which warrants imposition of puni-
tive damages).
209. E.g., Action, 450 F.2d at 1227; Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F.
Supp.. 136, 155 n. 7 (E.D.Pa. 1977).
210. Finch, supra note 176, at 36 & n. 204. See also supra text accompanying
notes 173-74 (briefly discussing the difference between "official capacity" and "in-
dividual capacity" lawsuits against public officials).
211. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1269.
212. Id.; see also Proffitt v. United States, 758 F. Supp.. 342, 345 (E.D.Va. 1990)
(rejecting Section 1985(3) liability against federal official in official-capacity law-
suit, but permitting subsequent individual-capacity lawsuit without prejudice).
213. Bell, 746 F.2d at 1269.
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114
section 1986, other arties may be held liable for failure to act
against the conspiracy. 1s a result, liability can be extended to
persons acting in their official capacity. 6
For a Section 1986 claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) the
defendants had actual knowledge of a Section 1985 conspiracy; (2)
the defendants had power to prevent, or to aid in preventing, a vio-
lation of Section 1985 by the conspiracy; (3) the defendants ne-
glected or refused to prevent the violation; and (4) a wrongful act
217
was committed by the conspiracy. Proof of a violation under Sec-
tion 1985 is essential to the success of a Section 1986 claim. Even if
action is not brought under Section 1985, the elements of a Section
2181985 claim must be satisfied.
Once a conspiracy is proven, the principal issue usually is
whether the defendants had actual knowledge of that conspiracy.
2
1
9
Because proof of a conspiracy often relies upon circumstantial evi-
dence, it can be difficult to impute actual knowledge of the con-
spiracy to the defendants. 220 Therefore, the defendants' actions will
best indicate whether they had knowledge of the conspiracy. 2 If
the conspiracy is within a police department, actual knowledge may
be proven by supervisors' attempts to remedy conspiratorial mis-
214. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1986 (1994).
215. Id. The statute provides,
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to
be done, and mentioned in [42 U.S.C. § 1985], are about to be commit-
ted, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of
the same, neglects or refuses to do so, if such wrongful act be committed,
shall be liable to the party injured ... for all damages caused by such
wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have pre-
vented .... and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect
may be joined as defendants in the action .... But no action under the
provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced
within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
Id.
216. E.g., Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157, 1161 (11th Cir. 1997) (action
against members of city government and police department); Clark v. Clabaugh,
20 F.3d 1290, 1294, 1298 (3d Cir. 1994) (action against members of city govern-
ment and police department); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 610 (7th
Cir. 1973) (action against mayor and other city officials).
217. Clark, 20 F.3d at 1295.
218. Park, 120 F.3d at 1159-60.
219. Id. at 1160; Clark, 20 F.3d at 1296; Hampton, 484 F.2d at 610.
220. E.g., Clark, 20 F.3d at 1296. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
221. E.g., Park, 120 F.3d at 1162 (suggesting analysis of police radio transmis-
sions during the alleged conspiracy's actions); Clark, 20 F.3d at 1297 (noting po-
lice's responses to "rumors" of conspiracy).
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222
conduct. Another possible source could be citizen complaints
about the misconduct.
After actual knowledge is established, the remaining issue is
whether the defendants neglected or refused to prevent the Sec-
tion 1985 violation. 22' The defendant's inaction does not have to
be purposeful. Rather, if the defendant negligently fails to act,
224then the defendant can be held liable under Section 1986. Thus,
when seeking municipal liability, Section 1986 offers an important
strategic advantage over Section 1983. Ordinary negligence is a
much lighter burden of proof than the "deliberate indifference"
required by Section 1983.
C. The Title VI Claim
Another measure against discrimination is Title VI. Codified
in part at 42 U.S.C. section 2000d, it provides, "No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subject to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance." 226 Although the statute does
not explicitly create a private cause of action, the availability of a
221judicial remedy is now settled.
222. Documentary evidence may not be an effective way to show police action.
Usually, police departments will not release personnel and disciplinary records
without a court order. E.g., Patton, supra note 75, at 761. These records are con-
fidential and can be immune from discovery. Id.
223. In the context of the prima facie case, courts usually do not discuss
whether a police department had the power to prevent a conspiracy's actions.
E.g., Park, 120 F.3d at 1160-61; Clark, 20 F.3d at 1298. For the purposes of this pa-
per, it is presumed that if ranking members had actual knowledge of a Section
1985 conspiracy within the police department, then those persons had the power
to prevent, or aid in preventing, that conspiracy's actions.
224. Park, 120 F.3d at 1160; Clark, 20 F.3d at 1298.
225. Supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
226. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(d) (1994). The remedies and standards applicable to
Title VI administrative hearings are not discussed in this paper.
227. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992). See also
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 601 (1983) (plurality opin-
ion) (holding that Title VI creates a private cause of action for injunctive and pro-
spective relief); Id. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Id. at 634 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (finding that Tide VI creates a private cause of action for both equitable
relief and damages); Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and
Blackmun, IJ.); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667, 696-98 & n. 21 (noting
that private cause of action was available for Title VI, then holding, by analogy,
that a private cause of action is available for Title IX). See generally Sheldon Joel
Tepler, Implying a Private Cause of Action under Title V, 6 U. ARK. LrrrLE RoCK L.
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Since most large police departments receive federal funding," 8
Title VI bars them from any discrimination against minorities. A
constitutional standard determines whether discrimination has oc-
2291curred. If an action violates the Equal Protection Clause, then
that action is discriminatory.23° As previously noted, to show this
violation, the actor must have had a "discriminatory purpose.
231
This procedure is the same as for Equal Protection violations
alleged under Section 1983. The principal advantage of action un-
der Title VI is that, once discriminatory purpose is shown, the
plaintiff has recourse against the program that received federal
funding. Other elements of a Section 1983 case, or the possibility
of immunity, are avoided.
However, Title VI's greatest advantage is the relief it offers.
232For example, declaratory and injunctive relief may be sought.
Thus, the claimants have the opportunity to help craft a remedy,
233suggesting structural changes that will end discrimination. In the
REV. 19 (1983). Now, a private cause of action is broadly recognized. E.g., Abram-
son v. Bennett, 707 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1989); Police Officers for Equal Rights
v. City of Columbus, 644 F. Supp. 393, 438 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
228. Community Oriented Policing Services ("COPS"), United States Dep't of
justice, Freedom of Information Act: COPS Grants Awarded by State (May 17, 2000),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/cops/foia/foiaerr.htm (providing state-by-state
listing of local police departments receiving federal block grant assistance). See
also 42 U.S.C.A. § 3751 (1994) (Department of Justice Drug Control and System
Improvement Grant Program).
229. In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, a badly splintered Supreme
Court found that a different standard applied to Title VI. The plurality held that
"disparate impact" was sufficient to prove discrimination. Guardians Ass'n, 463
U.S. at 590. Under this standard, discrimination is shown if an apparently neutral
program is discriminatory in practice, regardless of intent. Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989). This standard is also used for admin-
istrative enforcement of Title VI. Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 592-93. However,
the constitutional standard was supported by fivejustices. Id. at 612 (Rehnquist,j.,
concurring) (joining injustice Powell's adoption of a constitutional standard); id.
at 615 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, jJ.) Other courts subsequently recognized the constitu-
tional standard as the rule. E.g., Craft v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 793 F.2d
140, 142 (7th Cir. 1986); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion (LUCHA) v. Sec'y
of Hous. and Urban Dev., 779 F.2d 774, 483 (1st Cir. 1986). Cf Sandoval v. Ha-
ban, 197 F.3d 484, 503 (11 th Cir. 1999) (finding private right of action under ad-
ministrative enforcement provision of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1994), thus
allowing litigation under disparate-impact standard).
230. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 286 (1978) (plurality
opinion).
231. Supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
232. Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 596; id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 605 ("[I]t is without doubt that the portion of the order requiring
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case of police misconduct, possibilities include compilation of race
statistics for vehicular stops, or race awareness training for offi-234
cers. It is unlikely, as part of an equitable remedy, that federal
funding can be withdrawn.215 • 236
Compensatory damages are also available. Courts have not
yet defined the scope of these damages. When the Supreme Court
237examined the issue in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commisszon,
Justice Stevens suggested an analogy to Section 1983 actions. 2,8 If
so, Title VI compensatory damages would follow from common-law
239 240
torts.2 9 However, punitive damages are not permitted.
consultation to insure [no further] discriminatory effects constitutes permissible
injunctive relief aimed at conforming respondents' future conduct to the declared
law.").
234. Infra Parts III.D., IV.
235. Guardians Ass'n, 463 U.S. at 601-02. Title VI provides an administrative
remedy for the withdrawal of federal funding; the plurality in Guardians Ass'n was
reluctant to intercede. Id. (withdrawl of funding a "drastic" response); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000(d-1) (1994). As a practical point, action to remove funding appears un-
wise. It would directly threaten police departments with the possibility of com-
promised services. Also, it would increase acrimony between police and civil rights
advocates, whose collaboration is necessary if a plan to fight racial profiling is im-
plemented.
236. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70 (1992); Consol.
Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1984).
237. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
238. Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although not covered in detail here,
attorneys' fees are available for a successful action under Title VI. 42 U.S.C.A. §
1988 (1994).
239. Supra text accompanying notes 144-50.
240. Singh v. Superintending Sch. Comm., 601 F. Supp. 865, 867 (D.Me. 1985)
(citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981)) ("The
policies militating against an award of punitive damages against municipalities,
particularly their ineffectiveness as deterrents, are no different whether the dam-
ages are sought under Title VI or under section 1983.").
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D. Strategies For Settlemen?41
For civil rights advocates, litigation is an important tool in the
fight against racial profiling. Litigation creates the opportunity to
investigate the problem, and it brings together people and re-
sources. But litigation is also costly, and may forestall the resolu-
242tion of underlying problems. Thus, in the course of court action,
settlement should not be overlooked.
For racial profiling cases, settlement does raise some difficul-
ties. For instance, plaintiffs may feel that a court is the best forum
for justice to be served, particularly where a jury will determine
241damages. Settlement also avoids the creation of precedents, leav-
ing behind a still meager body of law against racial profiling.
However, settlement offers many advantages. First, it ends the
adversarial relationship between civil rights advocates and police.
Collaboration reaffirms the relationship between the police and
the communities they serve. Conversely, drawn-out litigation may
increase acrimony between police and the community. Second, the
parties can craft remedies serving both parties' interests, rather
than leaving this responsibility to the court. A settlement remedy
allows the parties to use their resources more efficiently, and en-
sures that the parties' interests are represented. Third, settlement
reduces the cost and duration of litigation. Issues of proof and li-
ability are avoided, and the parties can devote energy to proposals
that will effectively change police practices. The sooner the
241. This analysis is based upon settlement documents in racial profiling cases.
All documents are non-confidential and on file with the author. For each pro-
posed element of settlement below, appropriate provisions of the documents are
cited. The following documents were used: Stipulation of the Parties to Settle All
Issues after Approval by the Class, NAACP v. City of Carmel, (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17,
1998) (No. IP97-104C:M/S) [hereinafter Stipulation to Settle, NAACP v. City of
Carmel]; Settlement and Monitoring Agreement and Stipulations of the Parties,
NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, (E.D. Pa. 1995) (No. 96 CV 6045) [hereinafter Set-
tlement and Monitoring Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia]; Consent De-
cree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, (W.D. Pa. 1997) (No. 97 0354) [hereinafter
Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh]; Consent Decree, United
States v. New Jersey, (D. N.J. 1999) (No. 99-5970(MLC)), http://www.usdoj.gov/
crt/split/documents/erseysa.htm [hereinafter Consent Decree, United States v.
New Jersey]; Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, (D. Md.
1995) (No. MJG-93-468) [hereinafter Settlement Agreement, Wilkins]; Montgom-
ery County Department of Police, Montgomery County, Maryland, Memorandum of
Settlement, available at http://www.co.mo.md.us/services/police/newsevent.htm
[hereinafter Montgomery County Police, Memorandum of Settlement].
242. HENRYG. MILLER, ART OFADVOGACY-SETLEMENT § 1.02 (2000).
243. Id. at § 1.04.
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changes are implemented, the greater the benefit to the commu-
nity. In sum, settlement offers many strategic advantages. Even if
plaintiffs have overwhelming proof, settlement may provide a more
satisfying resolution of the issues.
The following list of proposals is not exhaustive, nor is it given
in any particular order of importance. The availability of different
proposals will vary, depending on the relative bargaining power of
the parties. In a class action suit, the parties must also be aware
that a final proposal requires ratification by the members of the
class.244
Statement of Policy. As a basis for the agreement, a policy state-
ment defines the basic principle behind settlement: to end the use
245of racial profiling in law enforcement. This gesture is largely sym-
bolic, but it ensures that police directly recognize that racial
profiling is at issue, even if police do not expressly acknowledge
246that racial profiling has occurred .
Data Collection. By requiring police to collect data on their ac-
tions, police can be monitored on their efforts to combat racial
profiling. Traffic stops are the primary source for data. At mini-
mum, the officer should record the justification for the stop, the
location of the stop, the race of the persons involved, and the reso-
lution of the stop. 4 ' Other procedures may be implemented for
vehicular searches and the use of drug-sniffing dogs. These pro-
244. E.g., Stipulation to Settle, NAACP v. City of Carmel at 4; see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(e).
245. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, 1 26; Settlement
Agreement, Wilkins, at 3; Montgomery County Police, Memorandum of Settlement, at
III.A.
The MCPD will continue to prohibit police officers from exercising their
police powers in a manner that unlawfully discriminates against individu-
als based on race, national origin, gender, religion, or ethnicity. In addi-
tion ... [officers cannot] use the race or national or ethnic origin of driv-
ers or passengers in deciding which vehicles to subject to a traffic stop ...
and in deciding upon the scope or substance of any action in connection
with a traffic stop ....
Id.
246. Some agreements include a disclaimer. Under its terms, a police depart-
ment can disavow whether racial profiling occurred at any particular traffic stop.
The disclaimer may also state that racial profiling is not condoned. E.g., Stipula-
tion to Settle, NAACP v. City of Carmel, at 2; Montgomery County Police, Memo-
randum of Settlement, at I.E.
247. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 11; Consent
Decree, United States v. New Jersey, 29; Montgomery County Police, Memoran-
dum of Settlement, at IV.B.
248. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 11; Consent
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cedures should include the grounds for the intrusion, if any; if the
search is consensual, written record of the consent should be in-
cluded. 249 Another possibility is the use of video and audio re-
cording during the stops. 25° However, limits on the extent of traffic
stop recordkeeping should be recognized. The cost to implement
the procedure is a consideration. Furthermore, if too much infor-
mation is demanded, or procedures are too complex, then report-
ing may become less reliable.
Access to police personnel records may also be sought.25' This
access may specifically include records on training, disciplinary ac-S • 252
tions, use of force, and racial incidents. However, a proposal of
this sort is very broad, and police departments are reluctant to dis-
253close personnel records.
If records are obtained, they can form the basis for litigation.
For example, records may indicate discriminatory purpose by indi-
vidual officers or discriminatory custom by the police department.
As a result, liability would arise under Section 1983 for violations of
254the Equal Protection Clause. But tactical advantages in future liti-
gation cannot form the primary basis for settlement. Rather, the
information should be used in a way that will constructively suggest
changes in police practice. Thus, it may be prudent to disallow use
of the offered records in future litigation against individual offi-255
cers. Instead, records may indirectly identify problem areas, or-
Decree, United States v. New Jersey, 29; Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, at 4;
Montgomery County Police, Memorandum of Settlement, at lV.B.
249. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 11; Consent
Decree, United States v. New Jersey, 29; Montgomery County Police, Memoran-
dum of Settlement at IV.B.
250. E.g., Stipulation to Settle, NAACP v. City of Carmel, at 7; Consent Decree,
United States v. NewJersey, 34.
251. E.g., Settlement and Monitoring Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadel-
phia, at 2; Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 6.
252. E.g., Settlement and Monitoring Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadel-
phia, at 2; Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 13 ("The City
shall conduct regular audits and reviews of potential racial bias, including use of
racial epithets, by all officers.").
253. Patton, supra note 75, at 761.
254. Supra text accompanying notes 97-101, 122-27.
255. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, 1 29; Montgomery
County Police, Memorandum of Settlement, at IV.B. Several other reasons support
limited use of records in future litigation. If individual officers have assurance that
records will not be used against them, then those officers have greater incentive to
fully participate in recordkeeping. The proposal also builds trust, assuring that
records will be used to further common goals of both police and civil rights advo-
cates. Police departments may also be more willing to provide greater access to
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ganized by precinct or neighborhood.
To help evaluate information, any data collection proposal
should require a computerized system. 56 This requirement helps
ensure uniform procedures, as well as ready access for persons
evaluating the police department's efforts against racial profiling.
Police Conduct; Training Initiatives. A settlement may also seek
direct changes in police conduct. For instance, in the course of a
traffic stop, police may be required to identify themselves and to
257
state grounds for the stop. But to encourage long-term change,
training initiatives offer a better means for ending discriminatory
conduct. Aside from promulgation of policy against racial profil-
ing, areas for focus include cultural awareness, communications
258
skills, and "incident de-escalation" techniques. An expert may
259
also be retained to evaluate training needs and set a curriculum.
Community Outreach. A settlement may create a framework for
community outreach, either by police260 or through an independ-261
ent agency. Several goals are served through community out-
reach. It informs the community of its rights during interactions
262with police. It can also provide a way to collect and evaluate
complaints against police."'
The success of outreach depends on effective communication
with the community. As a first step, an outreach proposal may in-
clude ajoint press release or press conference at the completion of
records.
256. E.g., Settlement and Monitoring Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadel-
phia, at 2; Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, at 4; Montgomery County Police, Memo-
randum of Settlement, at IV.G.
257. E.g., Montgomery County Police, Memorandum of Settlement, at V.C. See also
infra text accompanying notes 292-94.
258. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 20; Consent
Decree, United States v. NewJersey, 100; Montgomery County Police, Memoran-
dum of Settlement, at VII.B.
259. E.g., Montgomery County Police, Memorandum of Settlement, at VII.A.
260. Id. at V.A., VI.A.
261. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. NewJersey, 1 62.
262. Id. at 60; Montgomery County Police, Memorandum of Settlement, at V.A.
(promising to "explain the duties and responsibilities of police officers, the dan-
gers of the job, the reasons behind practices designed to promote officer safety
(but which might be misunderstood by the public), and other issues involving traf-
fic stops, arrests, searches and seizures"). If police choose to do community out-
reach, civil rights advocates should seek an approach that explains both police
power and individual rights, rather than simply justifying police powers.
263. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, 62; Montgomery
County Police, Memorandum of Settlement, at VI.A.
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the settlement.264 To ensure continued awareness, an advertising or
media strategy should also be considered.
Monitoring and Enforcement. To ensure continued compliance
with the terms of settlement, there are several methods by which a
police department can be monitored. One possibility is periodic,
written status reports by the police department on its actions
265against racial profiling. Or, representatives for the plaintiffs may
arrange direct meetings with the police department to discussS 266
compliance issues. The parties might also opt for an auditor or
other neutral third party, selected by agreement of the parties, to
track and evaluate police compliance.
Regardless of which overview mechanism is used, the proposal
should allow open access to records, particularly if new procedures• 268
are implemented to track racial profiling. Thus, plaintiffs can
evaluate whether substantial progress toward compliance is being
made. As a last resort, the agreement should provide an equitable
remedy through the courts.
A settlement should also provide a fixed duration for imple-
270mentation of its terms. This period varies from two to five years.
By imposing a time limit, the settlement creates a time frame in
which substantial results are required. It also forces the long-term
allocation of police resources to combat racial profiling. If the use
of these resources is established, then even after the settlement pe-
riod ends, police departments may be encouraged to continue the
program. If the program is shown to reduce incidents of police
misconduct, thus reducing further investigation or litigation, then
the program may pay for itself. Conversely, if programs are ineffec-
264. E.g., Stipulation to Settle, NAACP v. City of Carmel, at 10.
265. E.g., Settlement and Monitoring Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadel-
phia, at 2.
266. E.g., Stipulation to Settle, NAACP v. City of Carmel, at 9.
267. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 32-33; Con-
sent Decree, United States v. NewJersey, 115; Montgomery County Police, Memo-
randum of Settlement, at VIII.A.
268. E.g., Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 33; Consent
Decree, United States v. NewJersey, 118; Montgomery County Police, Memoran-
dum of Settlement, at VIII.D.; see also supra text accompanying notes 247-56.
269. E.g., Stipulation to Settle, NAACP v. City of Carmel, at 9; Settlement
Agreement, Wilkins, at 6.
270. E.g., Stipulation to Settle, NAACP v. City of Carmel, at 7 (three and a half
years); Settlement and Monitoring Agreement, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, at 3
(two years); Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, at 37 (five years);
Consent Decree, United States v. New Jersey, 1 131 (five years, but subject to re-
duction for two years' "substantial compliance").
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tive or are not competently administered, a durational limit re-
opens the possibility of litigation.
Damages and Attorneys' Fees. Money awards are rarely provided
for in racial profiling settlements. Damages may be suitable for a
small number of plaintiffs,2 7' but not in a class action. By limiting
recovery of damages in settlement, plaintiffs can ensure that public
resources are instead spent on changes in law enforcement. Attor-
272neys' fees have also been considered in settlement.
IV. LEGISLATION
Litigation is not the only recourse for communities affected by
racial profiling. State legislatures and city councils offer another
forum for action. By working for laws and ordinances that fight ra-
cial profiling, community advocates can achieve change without the
cost and acrimony of litigation. The following section examines
laws and other legislative proposals dealing with racial profiling.
These proposals can help form the groundwork for action at the
community level.
At least six states have enacted laws against racial profiling.273
Using Missouri's statute as a model, basic features of racial profiling
legislation will be examined. Then, some more novel measures will
be discussed.
The central feature of the Missouri law is collection of race
data on traffic stops. 27a Aside from the race of the persons stopped,
the officer must also record the alleged violation and indicate how
271. E.g., Settlement Agreement, Wilkins, at 7 (awarding each plaintiff $12,500,
for a total of $50,000).
272. E.g., Stipulation to Settle, NAACP v. City of Carmel, at 3 (referring to
separate, confidential settlement for damages and attorneys' fees); Settlement
Agreement, Wilkins, at 7*
273. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-10 (1999), amended by Act effective August 1, 2000,
ch. 67, sec. 17.2(a), 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws _; Act of June 5, 2000, ch. 325, 2000
Okla. Sess. Laws Serv. 1489 (West) (to be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 §§ 34.3,
34.4, 34.5); Act of May 30, 2000, S.B. 1053, 2000 Mo. Legis. Serv. - (West) (to be
codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 590.650, 590.653); Act of March 24, 2000, ch. 118,
2000 Wash. Laws Legis. Serv. __ (West) (to be codified at WASH. REv. CODE §
43.43); Act of June 23, 1999, P.A. No. 99-198, 1999 Conn. Acts - (Reg. Sess.)
(reprinted at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. APP. PAMPHLET at 117 (West 2000)); Traffic
Stops Statistics Act, ch. 00-251, 2000 R.I. Pub. Laws - (to be codified at R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31.21.1).
274. Act of May 30, 2000, S.B. 1053, 2000 Mo. Legis. Serv. _, (West) (to
be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 590.650, 590.653). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 247-56 (discussing proposals for recordkeeping as part of a settlement
agreement).
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the violation was resolved, including the content of a citation or
criminal charges. 5  If a search is conducted, grounds for the
search-whether by consent or probable cause-are recorded, and
the officer must note the result of the search. 76 The location of the
277stop is also included.
On an annual basis, law enforcement agencies are required to
report the data to the state attorney general. 2 8 The attorney gen-
eral, in turn, issues a summary of the findings.279 The summary
must compare the proportion of minorities stopped to the popula-
tion at large.28 °
Other states' laws have similar collection and reportingS 281
mechanisms. This information can be used to help show dis-
282
criminatory custom in police departments. But Missouri also uses
the records to establish patterns of behavior by individual offi-283
cers. If a pattern of racial profiling is found, then the officer is
214
required to undergo additional training or counseling.
Most racial profiling laws do not provide a course of action for
noncompliance with data collection rules. However, under the
Missouri law, police departments can be penalized by withdrawal of
275. Act of May 30, 2000, S.B. 1053, 2000 Mo. Legis. Serv. , (West) (to
be codified at Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 590.650, 590.653).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-10(2a)(1999), amended by Act effective August 1,
2000, ch. 67, sec. 17.2(a), 2000 N.C. Sess. Laws _; Act ofJune 23, 1999, P.A. No.
99-198, 1999 Conn. Acts - (Reg. Sess.) (reprinted at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. AP-
PENDIX PAMPHLET at 117 (West 2000)); Traffic Stops Statistics Act, ch. 00-251, 2000
R.I. Pub. Laws - (to be codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31.21.1). See also Act of
March 24, 2000, ch. 118, 2000 Wash. Legis. Serv. - (West) (requiring record-
keeping by state patrol and "encouraging" voluntary data collection by municipal
and county police); Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th
Cong. § 2 (proposing a study of traffic stops statistics, with the Attorney General
using a nationwide sample of jurisdictions). One state, Rhode Island, expressly
requires that individual officers' records are kept confidential. Traffic Stops Statis-
tics Act, ch. 00-251, 2000 R.I. Pub. Laws __; see also Traffic Stops Study Act of
1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. § 4; S.B. 1389, 2000 Cal. Legis. § 1(b),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?billnumber=sbl389&sess=cur&-
house=B (spaces between "bill" and "number," and between "sb" and "1389"). For
a discussion of the rationale behind confidentiality, see supra note 255.
282. Supra text accompanying notes 97-101, 122-27.
283. Act of May 30, 2000, S.B. 1053, 2000 Mo. Legis. Serv ... (West).
284. Id.
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285 286
state funding. Although the penalty may be harsh, it may also
prompt action where police departments resist programs against
racial profiling.
The Missouri law also encourages creation of civilian review
boards over police departments.18' The law gives the boards broad
power to collect complaints, conduct investigations, and recom-
mend remedies. 288 However, the statute disallows compensation for
members of the boards.8 9
Whether an uncompensated review board can professionally
manage and investigate police misconduct is a matter of dispute.
But an independent board can serve important needs. As opposed
to police "internal affairs" units, an independent board is autono-
mous. Thus, persons affected by police misconduct are more likely
291to step forward. One possible compromise is to have civilian re-
view boards without investigatory powers. The board would act as a
liaison on behalf of the community. If police misconduct is al-
leged, the board could then order an investigation from a neutral
party, such as the attorney general or some other state-funded
agency. The board would also interact with police, discussing gen-
eral concerns of the community.
Other states have proposed different solutions to racial profil-
ing, but it is questionable whether these solutions can be effective.
For example, the California Legislature is considering whether po-
292lice identification will reduce racial profiling. Under its proposal,
police are required to give their business card to any person they
pull over without a subsequent citation or arrest.29' Since even mi-
nor traffic infractions may justify a traffic stop,2 94 police could avoid
identifying themselves by issuing a citation. Even if police were re-
285. Id.; see also Act of June 23, 1999, P.A. No. 99-198, 1999 Conn. Acts __
(Reg. Sess.)(reprinted at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. APPENDIX PAMPHLET at 117 (West
2000)).
286. A penalty can increase resistance to change, or it can reduce the quality
of law enforcement for the surrounding community. See supra note 235.
287. Act of May 30, 2000, S.B. 1053, 2000 Mo. Legis. Serv. (West).
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Hazel Glenn Beh, Municipal Liability for Failure to Investigate Citizen Com-
plaints Against Police, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209, 220-21 (1998).
291. Id. at 220.
292. S.B. 66, 2000 Cal. Legis. § 1 (d), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/postquery?bill number=sb 66&sess=cur&house=B (spaces between "bill" and
"number," and between "sb" and "66").
293. Id.
294. Supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
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quired to identify themselves at every stop, enforcement would be
difficult. Motorists are in a vulnerable position during a traffic stop
and are unlikely to demand identification. In addition, a demand
for identification could increase tension during the stop.
Legislation can balance the power police hold during traffic
stops. It provides a direct opportunity to implement action against
racial profiling, whether at the state or local level. Even if pro-
posed ordinances are not passed, lobbying against racial profiling
can increase organizational clout and public awareness. Further-
more, concerted action may encourage police to make changes on
their own. 295 Thus, legislation, and the legislative process, is an im-
portant form of action against racial profiling.
V. CONCLUSION
"Driving While Black" has recently become the focus of wide
attention in the media. But racial profiling is a long-term problem.
It insults the dignity of persons of color, creating fundamental dis-
trust with police. It wastes law enforcement resources, on the false
premise that blacks and hispanics are more likely to be criminals.
There is no longer any dispute that racial profiling affects our
communities; now, it is necessary to end profiling and restore trust
between police and persons of color.
Racial profiling is an abuse of police power. Therefore, any
plan to combat the problem should examine the dimensions of po-
lice power. When this power stops serving the community it is in-
tended to protect, limitations must be imposed. It is up to the
community to determine the scope of police power, and communi-
cate what the limits are.
The mode of communication affects the success of the mes-
sage. Demands for relief in the courts can raise public awareness,
as well as redress the injuries of those directly harmed by racial pro-
filing. Proposals in a state legislature or city counsel can suggest in-
stitutional changes. But direct dialogue offers the greatest poten-
tial for change. A lawsuit may draw police attention, but resolution
requires collaboration between police and the communities they
serve. When both groups take positive steps to end racial profiling,
then a foundation of trust can be rebuilt.
295. For example, many police departments have begun voluntary collection
of race data for investigatory stops. Harris, Driving While Black, supra note 1, at 322-
23.
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